Suchergebnisse

ESG, or environmental, social, and governance, is seen by some as an instrument to tackle climate change, and by others as a tool to allow investors to assess climate change risks and opportunities. It has been widely politicized in the US, where Republican critics have characterized it as an attempt by the liberal financial elite to impose a leftist decarbonizing mission on the US economy through an investment risk back door. The current paper explores the way in which ESG has become a, perhaps unlikely, object of politicization by the political right. In doing so, it analyses the meaning of politicization in an ESG context and the various forms it has taken, both discursive and substantive. The paper also seeks to explain why it is that ESG politicization has occurred at particular junctures and draws on political opportunity theory from social movement studies to account for this. It further examines various reactions to the politicization of ESG that have sought to depoliticize it.

While narrative is a much-used term in environmental law scholarship, it is often used rather indiscriminately and interchangeably with other terms such as framing and discourse. The current article sets out to examine the various ways in which narrative features in the existing literature with a view to encouraging more critical and reflective usage. It also advocates for narrative, both to connect with the marginalised and to inject passion and emotion into environmental law – elements that can easily be lost in a discipline heavy with legislation and case law turning on fine aspects of legal doctrine. However, in the end it argues the need for a careful balance, with narrative and emotion playing a part, but not stealing the show.

AbstractGlobal legal pluralism is concerned,inter alia, with the growing multiplicity of normative legal orders and the ways in which these different orders intersect and are accommodated with one another. The different means used for accommodation will have a critical bearing on how individuals fare within them. This article examines the recent environmental jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights to explore some of the means of reaching an accommodation between national legal orders and the European Convention. Certain types of accommodation – such as the margin of appreciation given to states by the Court – are well known. In essence, such mechanisms of legal pluralism raise a presumptive barrier which generally works for the state and against the individual rights-bearer. However, the principal focus of the current article is on a less well-known, recent set of pluralistic devices employed by the Court, which typically operate presumptively in the other direction, in favour of the individual. First, the Court looks to instances of breaches of domestic environmental law (albeit not in isolation); and second, it places an emphasis on whether domestic courts have ruled against the relevant activity. Where domestic standards have been breached or national courts have ruled against the state, then, presumptive weight is typically shifted towards the individual.

Both rights and principles have long existed in EU law. The Charter of Fundamental Rights - made newly binding by the Lisbon Treaty – attempts to draw a distinction between the two types of norm. This article explores in depth the question of whether such a differentiation can easily be made, drawing from both the literature on rights and the Charter, and that on principles (particularly environmental principles). It examines a range of ways in which rights and principles might be thought to differ – including in terms of autonomy, whether they are single- or double-sided in scope, their legal impacts (binding or non-binding), forms of accountability (legal or political), and their jurisprudential nature. Having found that similarities abound rather more than differences, the article concludes by arguing that the weight placed on the distinction by the Charter is untenable.